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T HE past survey period was not remarkable in most respects. Family law
cases reaching the appellate courts were typically those with problems
falling in the interstices between established rules and doctrines. The courts'
main work was in defining the limits of existing principles. Further, little sig-
nificant legislation was passed.' The legislature did not have a chance to vote
on title 2 of the Family Code,' which died on the House calendar without being
reached. Texas lawyers were thus spared the effort of learning a substantial body
of new law for the first time in several legislative sessions.
Quiet as it was in the Texas courts, it was quieter yet in the Supreme Court
of the United States. Only three decisions of importance to family lawyers
were handed down. Reed v. Reed' held that an Idaho statute which preferred
men over women in the appointment of administrators of estates was un-
reasonably discriminatory and, therefore, violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. In a slight retreat4 the Court held in Labine v.
Vincent' that intestate succession statutes denying illegitimate children the
benefits given to legitimate children do not violate either the equal protection
or due process clauses. The only real shock came in Boddie v. Connecticut,"
which held that due process prohibits a state from denying, solely because of
inability to pay court fees and costs, access to its courts to indigents seeking
dissolution of their marriages.
I. ADOPTION
Two courts of civil appeals dealt with questions of the requirement of notice
to parents of children to be adopted. In one' the mother brought suit against
her mother to set aside an adoption decreed without notice. Summary judgment
evidence disclosed that the child's mother had known of the adoption for a
number of years and had taken no steps to avoid its effect. The court held that
the one-year statute of limitations on such actions' barred the action. In the
other case' the child was adopted by its grandfather in Arkansas. The mother,
a nonresident of Arkansas, was given published, constructive notice of the
adoption. The court held that no more than constructive notice need be given to
a nonresident parent for Texas to accord full faith and credit to a foreign adop-
* B.B.A., LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law, Texas Tech University.
'Parental consent to informal, or "common-law," marriages is now required for mar-
riages of minors when it is required in formal marriages. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, S
1.92 (1971). The statute dealing with abused or battered children was changed consider-
ably; it now requires reporting of possible abuse cases. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
695c-2 (Supp. 1972).
'Tide 2 would have changed virtually the entire body of family law dealing with the
parent-child relationship and the juvenile laws. For a description see Smith, Title 2 of the
Family Code, 33 TEX. B.J. 958 (1970).
392 S. Ct. 251 (1971).
"Cf. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), noted in 47 TEXAS L. REv. 326 (1969).
5401 U.S. 532 (1971), noted in 25 SW. L.J. 659 (1971).
6401 U.S. 371 (1971).
'Stewart v. Rouse, 469 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971), error
granted.
8TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § le (1969).
"In re Benfield, 468 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971).
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tion decree. This decision is defensible only if the proof established that the
mother's whereabouts was unknown and unascertainable."
The right of a life tenant's adopted child to take as a remainderman under
a trust instrument that makes a class gift to "children" of the life tenant was
again before the courts." Two inter vivos trusts were established in 1952 by
the life tenant's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Grady Vaughn, Sr. At the time the
trusts were created the life tenant, Vaughn, Jr., had a ten-year-old son, Grady
Vaughn, III. Three years later the trustor died. Subsequent to his death Vaughn,
Jr., and his wife adopted a son, Gary William. After the death of Vaughn, Jr.,
in 1967 the trustees instituted a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine
whether both the adopted and natural sons were entitled to benefits under the
trusts as "children" of the life tenant.
Upon appeal from a trial court judgment that Gary William was entitled
to share equally with Grady, III, the court of civil appeals affirmed, relying
principally upon section 9 of article 46a, which equates adopted children with
legitimate children and provides that "such adopted child shall be regarded
as a child of the parent (or parents) by adoption for all other purposes as well,
except that where a deed, will, or other instrument uses words clearly intended
to exclude children by adoption, such adopted child shall not be included in
such class."" This provision, adopted in 1951, was held by the court to create
a rule of construction requiring the inclusion of adopted children in class gifts
to "children" made after its enactment unless a contrary intent is shown in the
language of the instrument. Two earlier supreme court cases" (one involving
the same family) were distinguished on the ground that the words used in both
the instruments there involved indicated an intention to exclude adopted child-
ren.
The court seems clearly correct in the conclusion it reached. The trust in-
struments involved were executed after the 1951 amendment to the adoption
statute, and it is clearly correct to hold that the law in effect at the time of
execution should control for purposes of definition of class.
II. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT
In Meucci v. Meucci" the supreme court put teeth in the Bukovich doctrine,"
which gives res judicata effect to custody orders entered by sister states. The
Meuccis were divorced in Illinois in September 1969. Temporary custody of
the children had been awarded to the father in a preliminary hearing in June;
in the same hearing the mother had been enjoined from removing the children
from Illinois. In violation of the court order, she took the children to Taylor
County, Texas, in July. The final judgment of divorce ordered her to return
the children to the father and to litigate custody only in the Illinois courts. The
father then came to Texas and filed an application for writ of habeas corpus,
'"See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); cf. May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
"Vaughn v. Gunter, 458 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970).
12TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 9 (1969).
"Cutrer v. Cutter, 162 Tex. 166, 345 S.W.2d 513 (1961); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 161
Tex. 104, 337 S.W.2d 793 (1960).
14457 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1970).
"5Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1966).
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relying on the Illinois judgment. In October a Taylor County jury found a
material change of conditions since the June decree, and the trial judge gave
custody to the mother.
In a per curiam opinion the supreme court held that there was no evidence
of a change of conditions despite testimony that the mother was emotionally
and mentally stable since moving to Texas in July. Perhaps indicating their
impatience with interstate flight and violation of custody decrees, the court
tersely ordered the trial judge to issue a warrant for attachment of the children,
to turn the children over to the father, and as a final fillip denied the parties
the right of filing a motion for rehearing. Whether the rule is founded on the
doctrine of comity"6 or that of full faith and credit, the court makes plain that
sister state decrees awarding custody will be given the same effect as Texas de-
crees, merging all issues relating to the circumstances of custody as of the time
of the decree.
Strange v. Strange"' dealt with the opposite situation-a defendant who fled
Texas during a pending divorce suit and took the parties' child in violation of
a temporary order. The supreme court's opinion gave short shrift to the argu-
ments that the trial court was without jurisdiction to determine custody, saying
that until the suit is formally terminated by dismissal, "the court necessarily
retains its previously acquired jurisdiction to determine.., issues raised by the
parties, including any question of custody."1
Perhaps the most important case in the survey period was G. v. P.,"9 which
held that the father of an illegitimate child has no liability under Texas law
to support the child, and that denial of the right of support does not violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The majority opinion
held, in keeping with Texas authority,"0 that absent a legitimation or paternity
statute no duty exists on the part of the father to support his illegitimate child.
Remarkably, this case presented a clear issue on the constitutionality of the
Texas rule because the trial court found that the defendant was the father of
the child. The Supreme Court's refusal to review the decision of the court of
civil appeals indicates that no Texas court will hold Texas denial of support to
illegitimate children unconstitutional, leaving it to the legislature," or the fed-
eral courts,2 to remedy the deficiency.
6 See McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961), enforcing an
Oklahoma divorce decree as a matter of comity even though it affected title to land in Texas.
17464 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. 1971).
" Id. at 367. The Texas idea of continuing jurisdiction over nonresidents was further
applied in Davi v. Davi, 456 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970), error dis-
missed, holding that a divorce court had power to modify a support order even though the
obligor had become a nonresident. Ordinarily the obligee is left to his remedy under the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-4(1971), in those circumstances, because a sister state does not have to give full faith and
credit to an increase in a support order if there was no personal jurisdiction of the obligor.
See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
1466 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971), error ref. n.r.e.; accord, Wells
v. Hames, 464 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1971), error ref. -. r.e.
2'Home of Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965) (dictum); Lane v.
Phillips, 69 Tex. 240, 6 S.W. 610 (1887).
"The majority opinion noted that the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas
presented a paternity act in the last session of the legislature. S.B. 281, 61st Tex. Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1971).
"A three-judge federal court sitting in Dallas upheld the constitutionality of Texas'
denial of paternal support to illegitimates. S. v. D., Civil No. 3-4336-D (N.D. Tex., Nov.
1972]
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A court of civil appeals held in another case worthy of note that in a suit
for change of custody the first court in which suit is filed has exclusive juris-
diction to proceed with the matter, thus depriving other courts of jurisdiction
over the subject matter in questions of custody." Any judgment rendered by
the second court would thus be void, even without a plea in abatement or other
objection to the second court's jurisdiction. Despite the doubtful correctness of
the decision, by following it courts would eliminate the multicourt litigation
that is presently possible and which makes difficult the determination of paren-
tal rights. However, the supreme court has granted writ of error in the case and
will undoubtedly reverse on this point.
A relatively rare case dealing with the parents' obligation of support for a
child's necessaries was decided." Emergency dental treatment and follow-up
work was performed pursuant to a contract with the child's divorced mother.
The dentist sued the father for dental fees, claiming they were for necessaries
furnished the child. The father defended on the theory that the divorce court's
child support order was the extent of his obligation to his child. Upholding a
trial court judgment for the dentist, the appellate court held that the divorce
decree and support order did not limit the father's obligation for necessaries
furnished to his minor child, and that a right to recovery was established by
proof that the services were reasonable and necessary, related to the child's
health and welfare, and were the customary charges for such work.
III. MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND ANNULMENT
Amazingly, in the past year no cases of any significance, or even interest,
were decided on the questions of marriage and annulment.
Two hitherto unanswered questions under the Family Code were resolved
by courts of civil appeals. In Prewitt v. Prewitt" the husband was awarded a
divorce and custody of the parties' child by the jury on his counterclaim. The
jury also found that the wife was not entitled to attorney's fees incurred in the
divorce proceeding. There was little, if any, property to be divided between the
parties. The trial court disregarded the jury finding and awarded the wife's
attorney a fee stipulated to be reasonable. The court of civil appeals affirmed,
holding that attorney's fees incurred by a wife in a divorce suit are a "necessity"
if she had reasonable ground for bringing the suit and brought it in good faith.
Thus, even though she lost all issues, the debt was one that could be charged
against the husband by the trial judge in the exercise of his discretion. Authority
for the allocation of this debt to the husband apparently is found in section
3.63 of the Family Code," although the opinion of the court did not cite
statutory authority for its holding.
1, 1971). An appeal of this decision to the Supreme Court of the United States will be
made.
'3Kohls v. Kohls, 461 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1970), error ref.
ff.r.e.
2"Lawrence v. Cox, 464 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971).
15459 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970).
2uTEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, S 3.63 (1971) empowers the trial court to divide the
parties' property equitably. Charging debts of the community against one or the other spouse
now seems to be a division of "negative" property and within the power of the court.
[Vol. 26
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A second, and perhaps minor point was decided in Harvel v. Harvel." There
the husband sued for divorce on the alternative grounds of insupportability and
cruel treatment. His wife alleged as a defense the common-law defense of adul-
tery on his part. This defense had existed prior to the enactment of article 4630,
which stated that a spouse's adultery barred a divorce suit, but was repealed by
the legislature when it enacted the Family Code in 1969.' Attorneys had ques-
tioned whether the repeal of the statute and the failure of the Code expressly
to abolish adultery as a defense left standing the common-law defense. 9 The
court held (apparently) that the abolition of recrimination as a defense by sec-
tion 3.08 of the Code had the effect of abolishing adultery as a defense as well.
Although the opinion is not wholly satisfactory because of its failure to dis-
cuss the question fully, it will probably be followed.
Most of the divorce cases during the survey period dealt with problems at-
tending division of property upon divorce. Appellate courts have long accorded
trial courts the broadest possible powers to divide the community and separate
property of the spouses upon divorce under section 3.63 of the Family Code*
and its predecessor, article 4638."' Reviewing courts must find a division of
property "manifestly unjust and unfair" on the whole record before setting
aside a trial court order. The extent of this power was indicated by a civil ap-
peals decision"2 affirming a trial court judgment giving the wife only $277,000
out of a community estate of $1,134,000, a ratio of approximately three to one
in favor of the husband. The court said that the wife's burden on appeal was
to establish that there was no rational basis for the trial court division-a diffi-
cult, if not impossible, burden to bear.
Many lawyers are fearful of exposing their clients, whether male or female,
to a judicial division of property that is virtually irreversible. This factor, com-
bined with the difficulty of getting to trial on dockets that are jammed with
other divorce cases, has resulted in the common practice of negotiating the
terms of divorce and incorporating these terms in an agreement that is ap-
proved and adopted by the divorce court. Further, any lawyer who has par-
ticipated in divorce cases (particularly in metropolitian areas) is aware that
considerable pressure is exerted upon the parties to reach agreement to con-
serve judicial time. These agreements usually include provisions for division of
property, support of children, custody, visitation, and contractual alimony for
the wife."
The courts are still working out rules governing these agreements, as they
are a phenomenon of only the last five years. Cases that came before the ap-
pellate courts during the survey period indicate that lawyers should be cautious
"7466 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.) 1971).
28 Ch. 888, § 6, [1969] Tex. Laws 2707.
21 McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 36-37
(1971).30TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.63 (1971) authorizes division of all property,
whether real or personal, or separate or community, as the divorce court finds "just and
right."
31TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4638 (1960), as amended, TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
tit. 1, § 3.63 (1971).
2 Dorfman v. Dorfman, 457 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970).
"For a discussion of the early development of this body of law see Smith, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 115, 122-28 (1968).
1972]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
in their drafting of such agreements, since a number of suits to set them aside
were successfully brought. Careless representation in drafting or approving such
instruments may substantially harm a client. A series of warnings suggested
by this year's cases should be kept in mind.
(1) When are They Binding? A court held that agreements in contempla-
tion of divorce or permanent separation are not binding until the agreement
is approved by the divorce court, because the division of property on divorce
is addressed to that court's discretion. 4 A corollary of this principle is that any
such agreement has no effect upon the right of creditors of the community to
assert an interest in the property supposedly divided.' The moral: Lawyers
entering into such agreements should include indemnity provisions covering the
period between execution of the agreement and the approval by the divorce
court, or else run the risk that property set aside to their clients will be subject
to the claims of creditors of the other spouse. A provision should also be in-
cluded for judicial ratification of an agreement providing for changes in the
status of property in the interim between execution of the agreement and court
approval. For example, any income earned during that period should clearly
be covered in the final decree.
(2) Property Division or Child Support? The agreement should make plain
whether property allocated to a spouse is part of a property division or is to be
considered a portion of child support. One significance of this distinction is
that property settlement agreements are contractually enforceable' and not
subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court,"7 whereas decretal provisions
for the support of children are subject to such jurisdiction and can be subse-
quently altered.' Thus, if the agreement sets aside property to a spouse to be
used in the support of minor children, changed conditions will not justify a
change in that agreement; 9 the only remedy available is a suit to rescind or
reform the contract under the general principles governing contracts.
(3) Necessity of Full Disclosure. The spouses must make full disclosure of
the nature and extent of the community estate under their control or the prop-
erty settlement agreement may be set aside on the ground of fraud in a subse-
quent suit. The husband in a recent case was said to stand in a semifiduciary
relationship with his wife, placing upon him the duty of full disclosure of
" Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Liston, 464 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970),
error ref. n.r.e. The majority opinion stated that the agreement could not be an enforceable
division of property even though in contemplation of permanent separation because statutory
partition and gift are the exclusive methods of changing community into separate property
during marriage. This was probably dictum, but if accepted on its face, would be contrary
to a long line of Texas authority recognizing the viability of such separation agreements.
Id. at 409-10 (dissenting opinion). The overbroad statement is unfortunate because it casts
a cloud upon the spouses' rights inter se, and the case was concerned with creditors' rights.
Contra, Harding v. Harding, 461 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970) (dic-
tum; states that such agreements are valid if fair and equitable).
3 Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Liston, 464 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970),
error ref. nmr.e.
" Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967).
7 Martinez v. Guajardo, 464 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971); Eix
parte Duncan, 462 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1970) (failure to
perform agreement not punishable by contempt).
31TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4639a (Supp. 1972); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406
S.W.2d 419 (Tex. 1966); see Smith, supra note 33, at 125-27.
" Martinez v. Guajardo, 464 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971).
[Vol. 26
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assets of the community (and presumably separate) estates that are disposed of
by the property settlement agreement." Failure to do so vitiated the transaction
and made it possible for the wife subsequently to sue for an undivided one-
half of property not disclosed or, in the alternative, for damages for conceal-
ment of debts chargeable against the share allocated to her and for reducing
her share. In addition, the property settlement agreement is not binding on the
divorce court unless it is "fair and equitable," and, thus, may be disapproved.4
(4) Venue Considerations. Careful lawyers will insert provisions for the
place of performance of these property settlement agreements. Because they are
enforceable as contracts, property settlement agreements are governed by sub-
division 5 of article 1995, providing that venue may lie in the county in which
the contracts are to be performed.' Failure to insert such a venue provision
may result in an undesirable forum if suit is brought to enforce the agreement.
(5) Method of Enforcement. With careful drafting, enforcement of property
settlement agreements perhaps may be either by suits founded on contract or
by contempt proceedings for failure to abide by the terms of the settlement
agreement. A proper rule would seem to be that court-"ordered" contractual
alimony would be enforceable by contempt in the same fashion as a division
of property under section 3.63 of the Family Code.' In representing the obligee,
a lawyer should take every step to insure that his client has the fullest range
of enforcement devices available. A direct court order directed to the obligor,
requiring him to make the payments provided in the property settlement agree-
ment, should suffice."
(6) Execution. The attorney should be certain that steps are taken to effec-
tuate any property settlement agreement approved by a court. By way of ex-
ample, if either party has relinquished a community property interest in assets
disposed of by the property settlement agreement, all instruments necessary to
effectuate the allocation should be executed. A common example would obvi-
ously be directing a husband to execute a change of beneficiary form on a life
insurance policy set aside to him,' or executing deeds necessary to transfer
title.
(7) Court Approval. Agreements for custody of children and for their sup-
port are always subject to judicial approval. Existing Texas law requires that
the court specifically rule upon these two matters.'
(8) Consideration. Consideration is not a major problem when contractual
alimony is to be provided. Courts have held that periodic payments to a wife
provided in a property settlement agreement need not be referable to any spe-
4°Dudley v. Lawler, 468 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971).
"Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Liston, 464 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970),
error ref. n.r.e.; Harding v. Harding, 461 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970).
4Brasfield v. Brasfield, 466 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971),
error dismissed.
'Ex parte Latham, 47 Tex. Crim. 208, 82 S.W. 1046 (1904).
"But see Ex parte Duncan, 462 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1970) (dictum that enforcement by contempt would be unconstitutional imprisonment for
debt).
'Partin v. deCordova, 464 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastand 1971), error ref.
(wife entitled to insurance proceeds when husband did not change beneficiary, even though
she surrendered her interest in property settlement agreement).
4See Kohls v. Kohls, 461 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970), error
granted on other grounds.
1972]
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cific property of the spouses."' Because Texas courts are given great discretion in
the division of property,' the parties themselves may exercise similar discretion
and the courts will enforce the agreement they reach."9
IV. INTRAFAMILY IMMUNITY
Intrafamily immunity was struck a blow in Felderhoff v., Felderhofl,50 in
which the supreme court held that a child could sue his parent for personal
injuries sustained as a result of conduct of the parent not arising out of his
discharge of parental duties. Doubtless the doctrine of intrafamily immunity1
and its brother, the community property" defense, are on their way out.
"€Miller v. Miller, 463 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
(court apparently approved wife's description of the consideration for a husband's promise
as "'a gal twenty-two years younger than he' and the right to remarry.") Id. at 480.
48 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
'4 This statement is subject to the limitations described in text accompanying notes 39-41
supra.
'0 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971).
"The supreme court lost an opportunity to determine the issue of a father's right to sue
his unemancipated minor child for damages caused by the child's negligence in Wallace v.
Wallace, 466 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), judgment set aside and remanded
for settlement per stipulation, 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 58 (1971).
5 Cf. Smith v. Smith, 473 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1971).
(Vol. 26
